¡1 ' from seeing the sun first by reflection in water, and afterwards again directly in the firmament, we should to both these appearances give the name of sun, and say there are two suns" (i. 5.1, p. 55 M). T h u s error is in Hobbes simply aiUodot-ia. In predication it is applying a name (the mark of an idea) to a wrong object; in "silent cogitation" it is applying an idea (i. e. a sense-image) to a wrong perceptual object. Both these forms of uXlodogla appear in the Greek authorities. Theaetetus 189 B ff. examines the hypothesis that error in general means taking one thing for another (aiUudot-la) , and the figure of the waxen-tablet is introduced in 191C to illustrate the suggestion that it means applying an idea to a wrong percept. In (B) an otherwise correct Hoyos or descriptive formula is false when applied to the wrong object. In S 0 p h i s t e s 251 A B the categorical proposition "man is good" is rejected on the Ilobbesian ground that the "names of different things are copulated". In C r a t y 1 u s 429 C we find that the name may be applied to a wrong object; but Cratylus refuses to call this mode of error falsehood, and so we run up against the paradox ///} dritt iptvdtaftat. What does this mean?
8. In the swirl of critical and sceptical thinking so characteristic of the period to which Antisthenes belonged we find several distinct tendencies leading to the conclusion that falsehood is impossible. It will clear the ground if we inquire what the authorities have to say about these tendencies and their mutual relations.
One of these finds expression in the Protagorean h o m o m e n s u r a , with its subjectivist treatment of knowledge. It is fully discussed in the fourth book of Aristotle's Metaphysics, where it is regarded as implying the identity of taxlr and doxti th a t. The same attitude towards it is adopted by Plato in the Theaetet u s.
This principle is distinguished by Aristotle from another, which he treats as the direct denial of the principle of contradiction; it is attributed by him to certain persons, evidently distinguished from the (f vatxol (1000 a 2 xyiorrat 6i rift hr/pi tovtco jroXAol xul xior Jupt <1 ratios), who claim the authority of Heraclitus (1005 b 25) , and who may be reasonably identified with the Heraclitizers of Theaetetus 179 E, cf. Metaph. 1010 all. These deny the principle of contra diction on (lie ground of the transiency and relativity of reality itself; the centre of their position is the doctrine that contraries do not exclude one another; from this both Plato and Aristotle deduce as the logical conclusion the proposition that every statement is true (T li e a e t e t u s 183 A, Metapli. 1012 a 24). Both Plato and Aristotle regard the two principles as ultimately proceeding from the same root: thus Plato discusses both under the definition of knowledge as sensation, and Aristotle states that the origin of these sceptical paradoxes is.the failure to recognise any permanent conceptual being (1010 a 1).
The assertion in E u t h y d e m u s 283 E and in C r a t y 1 u s 429 C that ipti~do? is impossible has nothing whatever to do with the identity of opposites or the variability of opinion. The Ileraclitean principle virtually destroys the validity of every disjunction either ...or; in these passages the disjunction is enforced with Elea tic stringency; and Cratylus has no hesitations with regard to the possibi lity of objective truth. The paradox in Euthydemus l. c. is stated in connexion with the problem of negative predication; in view of its importance 1 give it in full: The common interpretation finds a play on the different meanings of the word Xtyeiv. Euthydemus begins by using this in the sense of mentioning an object; if you speak falsely you mention a distinct object, but in so doing, you say something, viz: a word or form of words (ovx aXXo Xtyei rutv ovrcov y exelvo ojteq Xt-ytt) , and this something is a real of its own kind. The argument does not contain this frigid sophism. There is indeed a play on the meaning of Xtyeiv, but the transition occurs later in the passage. You speak of the subject of discourse by name (Xtyovra to jujdyua jrt(i't ov civ d Xoyog //), in thus using the name, you distinguish the subject from other possible subjects (ovx dXXo Xtyti rcdv dvrcov i] extlvo ojiiq Xtyti), but the subject itself is an dv, (xdxtlvd y tor'iv tcuv ovtojv, d Xtyei); hence in all predication the speaker to or Xiyet, but -here comes (lie transition -to or liy u v is by definition rabjUT/ Ztyur. All predi cation is treated as involving a subject, which for the time being is accepted as real, and the point is that if 1 oppose your proposition S is F with S is n o t P, I assume the existence of S just as much as you do. The difficulty is more fully discussed in Theaetetus 187 Dff., where it is shown that the negative cannot be found either in the objects thought of or in the thoughts themselves. The argument of Euthydemus deals with the first of these two points; it is followed by another proof of the impossibility of yevdog, which deals with the second point. The words uttered by the orator have a positive existence as words (cf. llobbes' description of names as "sensible things" I. 2. 1, p. 14 M); so that he who speaks, speaks tu orru. The general attitude to predication is the one already recognized; names are related only to the ideas they express and to the things they betoken, so that the correctness of the proposition involves tilt' examination of the subject and predicate-terms separately. The difficulty about the negative is to be connected with the trouble over the copula mentioned by Aristotle, Physics I, 185 b 20. The aim of the paradox is not to deny the fact of error, but to reject the definition of ipevdog as saying that which is not. In other words, falsehood is uXXodogiu.
The denial of fiv d o g by Cratylus in
Cratylus 429 C has the same force, and shows more clearly its connexion with the doctrine that predication is applying names to things. Cratylus argues that every significant name has its own object; he admits that a name may be w r o n g 1 y applied; thus the discussion of the whole dialogue starts from the assertion of Cratylus that Hermogencs, a significant name, is not the name of the real Hermogencs; but he will not admit that it is falsely applied, because fivd o g means to iu] tu ovra Xtysi v.
This statement at once brings the paradox into intimate relation with the Parmenidean principle that not-being cannot be thought. This relation raises difficulties, as the Cynic theory of knowledge was undoubtedly sensationalist, until we grasp the fact that the applica tion is a sensationalist one. The question whether falsehood can be more than dbodogiu is raised in Theaetetus 187 D ff. in con nexion with the definition of bu a ri ¡iij as oyth) dog«, an empiricist definition which does not represent the views of Plato himself. The waxen-tablet is cited (cpaoi 194 C), probably from some contemporary, in illustration of the aZkotiogia theory. Here the idea is regarded as the copy of an impression and error as taking an idea to represent a wrong impression. Assume that the sense-impression, as caused by a real thing (cf. Hobbes), involves apprehension of a real, then the idea which is its copy must have a real content; and the name, if significant at all (C r a t y 1 u s 429 B), must not only have a positive content, but a content derived from objective reality. Hence neither subjectively' nor objectively can not-being be found in predication (Theaetetus 188 B).
The denial of contradiction in Euthydoinus 285 E implies the same view of predication and of error. A and B are supposed to be talking about the same thing. The thing is a thing in the full sense, a compound, not a simple element in things (t a "7 non a sg (ov rj/itl? re. ovyxeifitO-a xal rd/.j.u, Theaetetus 201 E; these may not have being asserted of them); hence it has not only an ovo/ict, but a Xnyos or formula "more largely" representing its nature {flair txciorrp rm r ovrmv Zoyoi .. . tug laziv). A and B in their discussion make various assertions about the thing, which they no doubt call by the same name; but they do not necessarily attach the same or the right formula to the name. Still, in no case can they be said to contradict each other: if both have in mind the right formula, they agree; if one has the right formula and the other a wrong one, they arc speaking of different things; if both have wrong formulae in mind, neither is speaking of the thing a t all. This argument is simply a statement of the disjunction "a formula is cither applied to the right object or to a wrong one" (see (B] ), with the alternatives distributed between two disputants. Similarly Zeno's paradox of Achilles and the tortoise repeats the argument of the stadium with two moving objects instead of one. In short, it is another statement of the principle that falsehood is aZZodogla. And it well brings out the point that on this treatment of predication truth and falsehood do not imply any synthesis of ideas; truth means having the right ideas and expressing them in words.
There is another point in which Hobbes' theory of error is in striking accord with that of Antisthenes. He recognizes a third alter native to the true and the false, viz: the unmeaning. Man's privilege of reason "is allayed by another; and that is, by the privilege of ab surdity; to which no living creature is subject, but man only". (Leviathan, I. 5, vol. III. 33 M) . In the true proposition subject and predicate are names of the same thing, in the false they arc names of different things. Falsehood may occur in one of two ways-. If I say that snow is black, my statement is empirically false, but not intrinsically false, because the predicate asserts that the snow has a power to produce in me a visual sensation, and snow, as a substance must be thought as having such a power; hence there is no intrinsic contradiction. But if subject and predicate are names of beings of different orders, then the proposition does contain an inner contra diction. Hobbes enumerates four kinds of being, body, accident, phantasm and speech; whence a "sevenfold incoherency of names" according as a name of one order is copulated with a name of another order. Examples are, "a body is extension (accident)", "a ghost (phantasm) is a spirit (a thin body)", "the definition (speech) is the essence (accident) of a thing" . (Logic, I. 5. 2-9, pp. 57-61 M). On Hobbes' view of predication the same point can be expressed by saying that in an inherently false proposition an unmeaning formula or compound name is applied to one thing; "for whensoever any affirmation is false, the two names of which it is composed, put tog ether and made one, signify nothing a t all. For example, if it he a false affirmation to say a quadrangle is round, the word r o u n d q u a d r a n g 1 e signifies nothing, but is a mere sound". (Leviathan, I. 4, p. 2 7 M). Thus, "when men make a name of two names, whose significations are contradictory and inconsistent", such "names are but insignificant sounds" ; "as this name, an i n corporeal body, or, which is all one, an incorporeal subs t a n e c" (ibid.). Now compare the doctrine of Antisthenes as set forth in (B). A word-formula (kdyog) which is significant, i. c., has an object, may be applied to the wrong object, but an inherently contradictory formula has as such no object (nvdevoc io ttv hjx).(~>q Xoyog), signifies nothing, as Hobbes expresses it. An example of such a self-contra dictory formula is evidently musical Socrates, the content of the categorical proposition Socrates is musical ex pressed, in the manner of Hobbes, as a compound name or Xoyoi;. Exactly the same doctrine is to be found in C r a t y 1 u s 429 B if.. with names (nvo(tuza) instead of formulae {Xoyoi)\ but the difference is quite immaterial, because the name and the formula are looked on as the same in kind (nvn/idzcov Ovfuz/Loxzjv tivai Xnynv ovaiar Theaetetus 202 B, C r a t y 1 u s 432 E; cf. Hobbes 1. c.). A name, argues Cratylus, has its own object, of which it may be called the peculiar name (ovo/ta JtQnorjxnr 432 E, cf. the nixffoc /.dyne of [ BJ) if it is a. name at all (jcdrza zd dvo/iazrt niy'hoc xuzni, do a ye dro/zazd idzzv 429 B), i. c., if it is significant. Such a name may be applied to a wrong object, though Cratylus will not allow that error of this kind Is to be called falsehood. As we have seen, the meaning is that error of this kind is really aklndo^in. Socrates proceeds, "If someone were to address you by the appellation Athenian stranger, son of Smicrion, Hermogenes, would this name be true or false or partly true and partly false?" Cratylus replies that the words would be as unmeaning as the sound of hammer ing at a brazen pot. (430 A.) The point of the passage has been missed by the commentators, who have not seen that a distinction is drawn between the simple name and the compound name or formula; the simple name, if a name a t all, is significant, and the only source of error is its application to a wrong object; a formula is unmeaning or insignificant if it includes names applicable to distinct objects, in this case Cratylus and Hermogenes. In other words, the formula is rejected on the same grounds as those on which the formula musical Socrates is rejected by Antisthenes in (B).
9. Before proceeding further, let us briefly sum up the points in the theory of Hobbes which show an attitude towards knowledge and predication similar to that of Antisthenes:
(1) The proposition is the application of names to things.
(2) The definition is a proposition in which a formula consisting of several names is substituted fora single name (Xoyng (mxQnc). (3) As in the proposition of the type S is P subject and predicate are both names of the same thing, the proposition is really assimilated to the definition. (4) The intensive meaning of the name is treated objectively, as the nvoia of the real object: this oidia can itself be signified by a formula consisting of several words. For the function of the name is to distinguish one thing from another.
(5) Thought is "computation", involving the resolution of com plexes into simple elements, as in the well-known alphabet doctrine of Antisthenes (Theaetetus 202 A ff.). (6) These simple elements arc alaOr¡rá (ibid.). (7) A word-formula, and hence a proposition, may be true or false (though Antisthenes rejects the name tpsvóoc) or unmeaning.
The only fundamental differences that can be noted are two. (1) If Cratylus stands for Antisthenes, then Antisthenes taught that names are natural signs, whereas Hobbes regarded them as arbitrary (J. 2. 4, j). 1(1 M). I shall return to this point later. (2) Hobbes had no difficulty in allowing the legitimacy of propositions like "Socrates is white", which were rejected by Antisthenes. But the general positions of the two thinkers are so much alike that we may hope to find some clue to their divergence of view on this topic. The logic of Antisthenes must have been the outcome of his materialism and his nominalism in as great measure as the logic of Hobbes.
10. According to the more common way of looking at the rejection by Antisthenes of the categorical proposition, he starterl from the standpoint of the Socrates effort to determine concepts, and because in this type of proposition the subject-concept and the pre dicate-concept are formally distinct, he rejected the latter as not contained in the former. This is Zeller's view. Or, as Prantl puts it, he regarded the predication of many names as destroying the abstract conceptual (begriffliche) unity of the thing (Geschichte der Logik, I. ill). Neither of these explanations will hold good, for the simple reason that they both assume that the idea of the c m ic e p t is the determining one. For nominalists like Hobbes and Antisthenes there are no independent conceptual distinctions: the concept (Begriff) is only the image (Vorstellung) translated into speech-form, and the image is only the sensation revived, and the sensation is an impression from outer reality. Hence Zeller's mode of stating the point is wrong, because for Antisthenes the subject is not a "concept" at all, but the real thing to which the name is given. Prantl's mode is wrong, because Antisthenes must have recognized only two kinds of real unity, the unity of the sensible substance, which does not exclude physical divisibility, and the unity of the simple sensation. More over the conceptual unity of m a n is just as much endangered by predicating of him as a whole, that he has a head and legs, as by predicating colour of him. From the standpoint of logical conception the physical parts of a thing are predicates of the whole no less than such qualities as colour. But Antisthenes evidently raised no difficulties about resolving a thing into its physical parts (see the example of Hesiod's chariot in Thcaetetus 207 A).
How does Hobbes treat this problem? In every proposition subject and predicate are names of the same thing. A common type of proposition is that in which the subject names a substance (i. e., a body), while the predicate is an adjective expressing some character of it, e. g., a body is moveable (I. 3. 3, p. 31 M). But how can these two names be names of the same thing? T o b e a body is not the same as t o b e moveable; the intension of the names, expressed in the abstract terms corporeity and mobility, is different. These abstractions stand for our ideas, and these are derived, through sensation, from things. Body and moveable are concrete names, names of the thing as the cause of different ex periences. As the substance-name betokens a group of powers, we may express Hobbes' meaning by saying that the subject is the name of the thing as a thing, the predicate its name as having a power. In Aristotle's language, arro and ni'ro jrtjroi'ftog (1024 b 30) are one and the same; Antisthenes' difficulty is solved by a realistic metaphysic; for Hobbes, as for every materialist, to be includes powers of action and passion (Sophistos 247 D). For Hobbes the "is" of the copula presents no problems, as it signifies no mqre than the relation of subject and predicate, as two names of the same thing.
Hence we may state the difficulty of Antisthenes thus; the pro position Socrates is white, if a proposition at all, signifies that Socrates and white are names of the same thing; but Socrates as such is the name of a thing, wbite as such is the name of a jrdi'toc;; how them can they both be names of the same thing? When wo call Socrates white we use the name of a /pro//«, when we call him short, we use the name of a /ityshoc (S o p h i s t e s 251 A). Put otherwise, how can the name white, in itself an abstract name, become a concrete name by conjunction with a substantive, without changing Its meaning? I may say that the distinction between the thing as it is in itself and its jcafr?) or characters, was familiar to Greek science at this time, and that the relation between thing and character was regarded very much as it was by Hobbes. In tho medical writers, to ask what a thing is in itself is to inquire into its (pvais (or tîâoç)' , its characters or properties are powers (tim-tx/ttec) to affect other things. These powers were for scienco simply the reali zation of the real nature of the thing. Difficulties about this relation of thing and characters arose in connexion with the medley of gram matical logical and metaphysical ¿jioqIcu of the "sophists", for which Parmenides and Zeno are ultimately responsible.
In point of fact, Antisthenes' rejection of the common categorical proposition is largely due to his misunderstanding of the copula. We know that the meaning of the copula was the subject of discussion at this time, possibly in connexion with the growth of the logical convention of expressing all propositions in the form S is P. The difficulty arose from the observation that the "is" of the copula is not existential; hence, as the primary meaning of "is" must be "exists" , some avoided equivocation and at the same time saved the categorical proposition by eliminating the "is". Some changed ctvfrçoijioç tori itvxn ç into ilrtlQ(Djioq x tltv x a n a i, Lycophron merely omitted tho "is" (Aristotle, Physics 185 b 25). The first solution avoids the use of two names, which would mean two things, by substituting a verb denoting an action or a passion. Lycophron's suggestion simply means adapting the verbal expression to the theory of predication viz: that subject and predicate together form one compound name of tho thing. Antisthenes, however, keeps the "is" in a peculiar sense, including both the existential "is" and the "is" of definition. Every proposition, affirmative or negative, affirms the existence of its subject, as we saw from E u t h y d e m u s 283 E ; so that from S i s P we can detach the S i s, equivalent to "the thing called S exists", without any change in meaning. Now every real thing qua real has a nature or essence (< f vaig, ovaia), inasmuch as it has determinate existence. Hence there is no contradiction in adding as predicate a formula expressing this real nature, because such a proposition asserts that the thing called S, or more exhaustively P, exists. You may substitute for the name carta description of the component parts of the cart (T h eaototus 207 A). "Is" here includes the idea "is composed of", and thus expresses the being of a compound object. Cart is tho proper name, and such a description the proper formula (olxslov (¡ro[ia, olxctnq Zoyoq) of the thing. Thus besides single denominative (this is Socrates) and existential propositions (Socrates i s), definitions are the only propositions left, and these, no doubt, must not be expressed by genus and differentia. All other propositions are formally defective.
And they are materially or metaphysically defective as well. For properly speaking the only real subject, i. e., the only object that can be said to exist and have a separate nature, is the sensible substance, the individual, of course. The simple elements of which we and other things arc composed, may be named, but cannot be said t o b e or n o t t o b e ; all being is concrete and individual; as these simples exist only as parts of concrete objects, to attach being to them is to treat them as if they were concrete objects. These simples arc not sensations, but qualities in things and perceptible by sensation (aloftr/ra Theaetetus 202 B). Antisthenes' con tention that silver and tin cannot be defined is probably directed against the scientific doctrine of the four elements; earth is a scientific abstraction. He possibly thought of silver and tin as themselves abstractions; what is is the piece of silver, the object made of it. Sensible form and matter are inseparable. Hence even if the categorical proposition has an unexceptionable subject, the name of a concrete individual substance, no adjective can stand as predicate, because it is the name of a part or aspect of the substance, and such part cannot be said to be. A simple unanalyzable attribute such as w h i t e can only be named; so that in the white is white ofSophistes 251 B (if the "is" is allowed at all) "is" means no more than "is named". Apelt (Bcitrage, 205 n), has raised the question whether Anti sthenes rejected propositions of the form "Socrates sits", where the copula appears in the verb-inflexion, without use of the verb to be. Apclt thinks not, mainly on the ground that his objections were to the use of toriv as copula. But if my account is correct, the use of the verb to be was oidy part of the difficulties of Antisthenes. In its broader aspects his theory seems to make minor variations in the verbal form of predication as accidental as they arc in the theory of Hobbes. For if predication means giving a name or names to an object, then the verb-form "sits" must contain a name, and the proposition asserts of reality the complex Socrates-sitting. Thus the old difficulty recurs: for taken by itself sitting (to xafrrjo&cu) is the name of a posture (axijfia), which belongs to another order of reality than a suhstance, and how can the mere uttering of the word after the name of a thing turn it into the name of the thing? The doctrine of the one-to-one relation of thing and ovo/ict precludes Apelt's interpretation.
We should he wrong if we supposed that this theory of Antisthcncs was purely critical and destructive, ft would seem to be a crude attempt to meet extreme scepticism in metaphysical and logical theory by a kind of positivism which runs to the opposite extreme in the true Cynic manner. The neo-Hcracliteans of the Thcaetetus and book 4 of Aristotle's Metaphysics seem to have united with the Megarians in denying the unity of the substance on the ground of the relativity of all its accidents; Antisthenes retorts that the unity of the substance is guaranteed by immediate experience, and that all forms of verbal statement which separate subject from accident are intrinsically false. The lleraclitean denial of the principle of contradiction, we arc told by Aristotle (Metaph. IV. 1007 a 22), made all predication accidental: now some of the eristics of the time had carried this principle so far as to argue that because Socrates is a man, and "Socrates" is different from "man" , Socrates is different from himself (Soph. 101. 166 h 32). Another extravagance of the same sort, is the following: the accident of blackness belongs to the Indian in respect of his skin, the accident of whiteness in respect of his teeth; therefore the Indian is both black and white (the olxtia ovoiiaain of Topics 109 a 11); and "is" being now interpreted as "is in essence" seems to carry a contradiction.
Antisthenes cuts the ground from under the feet of such ab surdities by rejecting all propositions in which "is" is the copula, and confining the use of "is" to existential propositions and defi nitions. Such propositions as "Socrates is white" destroy the unity, not of th e concept, I t u t . o I the substance. It is true that the cure was not much of an improvement on the disease, as it rendered all normal predication impossible, just as the Humian denial of any relation of the subject to the object save that of simple apprehension renders judgement and predication unintelligible. The metaphysical difficulties of this period were only set at rest by the Platonic-Aristotelian doctrine of the Categories, which recognised and classified various kinds of being. The logical difficulties were solved by the theory of community of kinds in the Sophistes, which explains the copula as denoting not existence but the relation of participation. Observe that this solution uses the idea of ytvr/. In other words, it is just by the application of the idea of conceptual being that Plato is able to surmount the obstacles to logical progress that beset his contemporaries. They failed, not through misapplication of the idea of the unity of the concept, but from inability to understand what a concept is.
11.
For so thoroughgoing a nominalist as Hobbes, thinking means using language and knowing means using language aright, that is, so as to reproduce in words the real distinctions of things. The function of thought is to copy particular reality. For Hobbes the chief source of error is the misuse of words, which are "wise men's counters but the money of fools" : so Antisthenes regarded falsehood as the wrong application of words, and the doctrine of the olxtloQ Xu'/oq con tains the position that in the common categorical proposition you are separating in words what is not separated in reality, since the accident has no existence apart from the thing. It follows from these premisses, on the other hand, that if words are correctly used, then the knowledge of words will give a knowledge of things, for correct thinking means arranging word-counters in the same order as their objects. This view is held by Hobbes; the definition is for him a primary proposition in reasoning, i. e., a proposition forming the ulti mate major premiss of deduction: there are no axioms except de finitions or propositions forming parts of definitions. The definition is in itself only a verbal formula; it is indemonstrable, and its validity can only be determined by an appeal to direct experience; but once this is established, it can become the basis of reasoning, in itself a purely verbal process, which Hobbes tends to look on as a kind of game. Thus the definition has a function like that of the simple names of Antisthenes, which express unanalyzable sense-elements. And the Platonic Cratylus (i. e., Antisthenes) says in so many words that the way to the knowledge of things lies through the knowledge of their names (435 D). Such a theory identifies thinking, apart from the use of sense-images, with the use of language, and makes the relation of thought to things a purely external one. The tneaning of the term is the real objects, perceived or imagined, which the word denotes.
Hobbes regarded the name as a mark or counter arbitrarily chosen to assist the memory (I. 2. 4, p. 1G M). Now the arbitrary connexion between the name, as a sound, and the tiling signified, had been noticed by Gorgias, who investigated the conditions under which knowledge can be communicated by language (Pseudo-Aristotle, MXG 980 a 13 ff.). But the Platonic Cratylus advances the proposition that names are not conventional (aw&t'jxij) but natural (r/don); and his theory implies that there are many artificial languages but only one natural language (Cratylus 383 A B) . The whole of the dialogue is devoted to the discussion of this doctrine. In the first section Socrates, using the youth Hermogenes to register the results of his dialectic, as Louis XIV used the Parlement to register his de crees, shows that language must be natural in the sense that it. embodies logical distinctions, though the matter of the language, i. e., the actual sounds used to express thought, is an irrelevant variable (389 D). But in the second section a new conception of the function of speech makes its appearance. Not only the form, but the matter of language must represent its object; there must be an intrinsic connexion be tween the speech-sign and the thing signified; in other words speech must copy (dxout/uTofhtt 424 B) the nature (ovaia) of things. In modern terms, language is a system of imitative gestures. This doctrine is worked out in a remarkable way. Speech is composed of words, words of syllables, syllables of letters; hence it follows that each letter must be significant. Significance must mean exact imitation, not symbolism. But how can these directly imitate objects? Speech is (l) physical articulation producing (2) sounds. The connexion of sound and object is obviously arbitrary, as Gorgias had insisted. But Socrates finds a natural connexion in the movements of the organs of speech in articulation. Thus rho signifies movement, lambda smoothness, etc. (424 G ff.). In other words language is regarded as a corporeal phenomenon, reproducing corporeal qualities and affections (42G C--427 C).
Modern critics are at a loss to know what to make of this doctrine. Some, regarding it as Plato's own theory because it is developed by Socrates himself, ignore its perversity and descant on Plato's grasp of the principles of a scientific language. But the theory cannot be Platonic. (1) According to Bonitz' canon the teaching of the dialogues is to be found in those positions which are left unrefuted in the course of the discussion: now the whole of the last part of the dialogue is taken up with the refutation of this extreme theory; the dialogue teaches that language is natural only in the sense of the earlier doctrine (389 D), that it must represent real distinctions of thought in any sounds it pleases. (2) The theory is endorsed by Cratylus himself, and forms the underlying presupposition of the conversation between Socrates and Cratylus (428 B-440 E). (3) On the principle that knowledge of things lies in the knowledge of names, the theory seems to have a metaphysical "significance; for if names are resolved into letters, and these simple sounds are produced by different kinds of motion, it follows from the exact correspondence of sign and thing that reality is essentially in motion. This view is put forward by Cratylus and opposed by Socrates, here of course speaking for Plato himself. Thus this doctrine forms an integral part of the system of the Platonic Cratylus, which we have seem reason to identify with that of Antisthenes and this being so, we must attribute the doctrine to Antisthenes, himself.
And observe how well it fits in with the requirement that language shall reflect reality, in the form familiar to us as the doctrine of Anti sthenes. It carries out to its extreme limits the principle of the one-to-one relation between sign and thing signified. Knowledge means resolution of compounds into simple elements. The word itself becomes a sort of definition, as every element in it has its significance. May we not see in this account of names an attempt to carry out fully the con ceptions of T h e a e t e t u s 202 A ff. ? The word is the unit of speech, and the letter a part or fraction of this unit: the thing is the unit of reality, and the sensible quality or accident is a part or fraction of it, a mere nothing apart from the whole. I n a n ideal language the word stands for the thing, the letter for the accident which cannot subsist a p a r t from the thing, but without which the thing would not be what it is. Thus magnitude would be predicated of an object, not by attaching the adjective great to the name of the object, but by including the letter alpha in its name (Cratylus 427 C). The illustration of the letters in Theaetetus 201 E would then be no mere analogy. This doctrine, again, is not advanced merely as stating an ideal towards which language should strive. Cratylus argues,that the principle is to a great extent embodied in the Greek language, although it. is imperfectly carried out. As he regards speech as a gift from the gods to men (438 C), this imperfection must be due to the degeneration of human nature. The universal language suggested by his words in 383 A must be the language originally given to men, from which through dispersal and forgetfulness they have deviated into the multiplicity of existing dialects. Such a doctrine is in complete harmony with the Cynic view of human history, which was in direct opposition to that of the science of the day. Science looked on mankind as advancing with the whole world from simplicity and homogeneity to complexity and heterogeneity; the Cynic found civilization a declension from the Golden Age of the poets. Homer and Hesiod were for him prophets belonging to an age in which man's separation from the divine was less complete than it is now. For the Protagorean the good in human life is vofitit, the result of man's own efforts; for the Cynic all that is vdfjco is an accretion to human life, which it is the business of the wise man to strip oif, retaining that which is natural.
12.
The whole system of Antisthenes is to be read in the light of the distinction betwenn (pvaiq and v o fio c The Humanist position, of which Protagoreanism is the type, was that all moral and social principles are the product of human reason, so that their ultimate sanction is to be found in human happiness. Man himself is the lawgiver (j>o//oWr//$). The end of conduct is to be seen in the development of the moral practices of the several communities. But Antisthenes everywhere opposes the natural to the legal, which he regards as merely conventional. The common aims of contemporary civilisation are not rational; what is good in them is the survival of a far-off age, when the gods were in communication with men; the rest is an accretion of customs, habits, and vain imaginings. The good man is the wise man. The first function of wisdom is to determine by the Socratic clenchus how much in human life and aims is a mere human product. The elenchus shows that all speculation, scientific and metaphysical, rests on an insecure basis. It shows that the common practical aims of men, the acquisition of wealth, of power, of knowledge, of social position, are vain. The second function of wisdom is the practical one of shaping one's life in accordance with the results of the elenchus, which has sorted out the natural and the conventional elements in human social existence. The natural man is man as God made him; the social man is man as he has made himself. God made him a body, with feeling conditioned by bodily processes, and with a reason, clothed in the faculty of speech, the function of which is to serve as a guide to conduct").
As the gift of the gods to men language has a prerogative over other ways of discovering the truth; but like all gifts it has been misused. Henoe one of the first tasks of the wise man is to criticise language as the vehicle of knowledge, to show the incoherences and inconsistencies which have corrupted its original purity, and thus restore it to its proper position as a source of knowledge. This I take to have been the main object of eristic as employed by Antisthenes. Now if this was the general position of Antisthenes, it is quite inconceivable that he should have taught anything like the relativism and subjectivism of Protagoras. No doubt the variation of actual moral practice was the starting-point of the ethical doctrines of Antisthenes, as it was for Protagoras; but his conclusions must have been totally different. For Protagoras the "just" is what the community determines to be just for itself. The social contract theories cited by Plato proceed from the same gymnasium; morality is obedience to vofioti, regarded as no mere custom, but as law; and society is its own lawgiver. Protagoras does not appear to have attempted any radical reform of the existing moral codes; he merely sought to find a humanist and rationalist basis for then; anti-social inferences from the social-contract theory seem to have arisen later, when the right of the community to override the private judgement of the individual 8 * 8) Antisthenes must have interpreted the opposition between nature and convention in a theological, not a scientific, sense. In pseudo-Hippocrates de Victu, which stands very close to the doctrines of Heraclitus, nature and convention are opposed as the divine and the human (s. 11, FVS2 p. 83. 29) . But in Protagoras, and especially in Critias, for whom the gods themselves are the products of human imagination (FVS2 p. 620-1), the opposition has become explicitly anti-theological. Antisthenes admitted that the gods of popular mythology are vu/ mi) (Philodemus de Pietate, ap. Diels Doxog. 638), but asserted the existence of one natural God. In view of the general attitude of the Cynics to science I think his theology must have been more like that of Socrates than that of Diogenes of Apollonia, as Diimmler supposes.
began to be questioned 10). I believe Antisthenes to have been in thoroughgoing opposition to the whole system of thought from which social-contract theories proceeded. They applied the methods of empirical science developed by the physicists to the explanation of society. In Antisthenes the Socratic independence of scienco had hardened into active opposition. Society as it is must not be regarded as an improvement on a previous natural state of war, but as a declension from the Golden Age of the poets. Moreover, he preached an Umwcrtung «1.Her Werto; and hence must have had some objective standard of truth by which to test the principles he rejected. His wise man is is his way as aristocratic as the wise man of Heraclitus or Plato. His denial of falsehood 1 have shown to mean only the rejection of the common definition of falsehood, not the denial of the possibility of error. His paradoxical denial of contradiction comes from an excessive objectification of thought. The definition of knowledge as oyih'j doge ¡u rn yLoyor inTheaetetus 201D evidently distinguishes between dog« and ijnoTtjfttj, the difference being essentially this, that tjr/or/y,o// analyses the object of dog«. Plato's words in 2011) (xa't wv ¡nr ¡n) igti xdyoc, orx ijtnntjTi't elvcu, ovtvjgi xal dro//«g«r) imply that Antisthenes himself coined the word txiOTijTos; to express the difference between the object as popularly and as scientifically known. Plato was dissatisfied with this differentia; the argument in Republic V showing that he who recognises the existence of the particular only, and denies that of the universal, has opinion but not knowledge, is evidently directed against a doctrine which draws the distinction between opinion and knowledge, but which describes the distinction 10) Neither in the myth of Protagoras (Protagoras 320Cff.) nor in tho exposition of his doctrine in Theaetetus 107 C, botli of which 1 take to l)o substantially historical, is there any suggestion of a conflict between tho will of the individual and that of the community. Contrast the socialcompact theories of Republic II. 368 E ff., and Gorgias 483. The view expressed in the text on the philosophical position of Protagoras is that contained in my article in Mind, N. S., vol. XIX, pp. 470-492. Tho present paper was written before the appearance of II. Gomperz' brilliant "Sophist ik und Rhetorik".
My view that Protagoras had no positive ethioal and political system of his own, but sought rather to justify rhetoric as expressing the principle of freedom of discussion, is in substantial agreement witll the conclusions of Gomperz (see Soph, und Rhet. pp. 271 ff.).
as meaning different ways of looking a t the particular object. The principles of Antisthenes were no doubt hostile to metaphysics, without which Plato held that knowledge had no real foundation, but they were not hostile to knowledge in a restricted sense of the word. Realism, not subjectivism, was just as essential to the Cynic system as it was to Platonism and Stoicism.
13,
There remains the question whether there was any connexion between Antisthenes and the doctrines of Heraclitusu ). I have already shown that Antisthenes was in opposition to the denial of the principle of contradiction attributed by Plato and Aristotle to the Heraclitizers. But we have to ask whether he adopted principles from the original system of Heraclitus. There is some evidence for connecting Cynic doctrine with Heraclitism, chiefly in the Cratylus. Thus a) Cratylus seems to stand for Antisthenes in this dialogue: but the historical Cratylus was the most extreme of all the Heraclitizers, according to Aristotle (Metaph. 1010 a 12). b) Cratylus urges that the examination of names is in favour of the Heraclitean doctrine of change and against the Eleatic doctrine of permanence (436 C). c) Socrates argues against him that both objectively and sub jectively some fixity of concepts is required if knowledge is to be possible (433 D ff.).
d) The Cynic doctrines that there are many popular gods but only one natural god (Philodem. dc Pietate c. 7, Cic. D. N. 1. 32); the position implied in the Cratylus that there are many artificial languages, but one natural language; the ethical contrast between the one natural good ((pQovtjaig) and the many popular goods; all these have a Heraditoan ring, reminding us especially of the contrast between the common reason of the wise and the varying views of the many (fr. 92 Byw.).
e) The adoption of Heraclitean physics by the Stoics.
u ) The view that Antisthenes taught the principles of Heraclitus was first suggested by Schleiermacher in his introduction to the Cratylus. Zeller seems to endorse it, Socrates and the , Socratic Schools, p. 298 n. Diimmler argues fpr it at length, Akademika 147 ff.
3*
The evidence is not conclusive:
a) The historical Cratylus was apparently so penetrated with flic idea of a perpetual stream of existence that he would not even name things, but pointed to them with his finger: as the Platonic Cratylus makes names the centre of all knowledge, we must suppose that he stands for a thinker whoso views might he regarded from the peculiar standpoint of Plato as equivalent to Heraclitean principles. b) For Plato to uphold the Heraclitean view of the world may mean little more than to maintain the validity of empirical knowledge as against Parmenides: in Theaetetus 152 E the doctrine that being implies becoming is attributed to all the ooc/xti except Parmenides, the list including Empedocles and the poets. The arguments cited in 153 A If. as advanced to prove the reality of motion, whatever their source, tend to show that all permanence is conditioned by some change. Plato reckons himself a follower of Parmenides on the funda mental question whether ultimate being excludes or includes change: hence in his terminology Heracliteanism can be extended so as to include all empirical materialists who deny the existence of unchangeable conceptual entities (cf. Aristotle Metaph. 1010 a 2).
The only schools to which the name Heraclitean in this extended sense was inapplicable were the Eleatics and the Megarians. Hence we cannot infer that a thinker whom Plato calls Heraclitean called himself Heraclitean.
c) In the concluding section of the Cratylus, Cratylus is indeed made to support the Heraclitean view against the view developed by Socrates (4401)). Hut we must carefully examine what the opposing views are. Note in the first place that the ideas discussed are ethical, the just and the fair. Now, according to my reading of Antisthenes, It is just in this ethical region that Antisthenes did hold doctrines in which a Heraclitean relativism was prominent. 1 think it probable that he regarded justice and beauty as artificial man-made ideals, not included in the natural good. The simple state of Republic II is generally regarded as referring to the Cynic theory: in this state it is said that there is no justice: J believe this to be Cynic: the simple state is good just because there is no need for justice, interpreted as public prevention of encroachment: for Plato it is deficient because it affords no opportunity for justice in a higher sense. In Cratylus 1. c. Socrates argues for the existence of a just in the sense of the Platonic Idea, and for a permanent faculty of apprehending it, on the principle that like is known by like. Cratylus assents to the unity of the just, as distinguished from the many justs, but when Socrates argues back to the fixity of the corresponding means of apprehension, he withholds his assent, and asserts his adherence to the Heraclitean view. The admission of Cratylus, that "the just" is, has been held to disprove the identification of Cratylus with Antisthenes 12). But observe that the Platonic Cratylus must admit the logical unity of the just, because of the existence of the name just: no more than this is implied in his admission. The content of the term may still connote relativity. Socrates' argument in favour of the subjective fixity of the concept is directed against a psychology which recognises only a succession of passing ideas and judgements. Hence the Heraclitism professed by Cratylus may mean no more than that the real world and consciousness exist in time, and that most ethical conceptions are the vagaries of human imagination.
d) The distinction between the natural and the conventional undoubtedly has its roots in the two-aspect view of reality so prominent in the fragments of Heraclitus, its multiplicity for crude experience and its unity for thought. Tho distinction appears explicitly in the Heraclitising Pseudo-Hippocrates de vichi, s. 11 (b'VS2, p. 83. 28). But it had been so widely accepted and so much developed by later thought that even if it was the corner-stone of the Cynic system, we need not assume a conscious reference to Heraclitus. e) Tho Stoics probably adopted Heraclitean metaphysics on their own account, and not as a legacy from the Cynics. Antisthenes I believe to have rejected all the speculations of the philosophers as part and parcel of the vain imaginings of men in the degenerate latter days. That a follower of Socrates who undoubtedly claimed to carry on his master's teaching in a purer form than any other, should have set himself to popularise Heraclitus, seems to me improbable in the extreme, especially as there appear to have been plenty of others engaged in popularising Heraclitus. Indeed I cannot conceive of Antisthenes as popularising anyone but himself. This much may be conceded, that he not improbably opposed the Elcaticising doctrines 12) Horn, Platonstudien, N. F. 61.
of Plato and the Megariaais by asserting his adhesion to the Heraelitean view of existence, interpreted in a wide sense. 1 conclude, therefore, (1) in view of the Platonic attitude towards Heraclitus and Parmenides, we cannot infer that any doctrine was intentionally Hcraclitean from the fact that Plato applies this epithet to it; (2) the doctrines of Antisthenes were Hcraclitean only in the sense that he regarded all existence as conditioned in the time-series; (3) if lie did ever appeal to the authority of Heraclitus, it was only in connexion with the question whether to b e excluded to become, and possibly also in regard to the traditional civic virtues.
